The Turner Report has been widely described and commented on by the media.  You can read it yourself, and it is certainly worth a quick look as a high-quality example of fact based decision making.  This is heartening, and a contrast to the many decisions we have to live with that appear to be made subjectively by people uninterested in detail fact.

This page comments on how the Turner Report stacks up against the design principles that the Occupational Pensioner's Alliance established in advance of the report.  The OPA focuses the opinions of more than a million occupational pensioners, via organisations like AMIPP,  so it will tend to reflect concerns like yours.  The OPA co-sponsored a meeting of the All-Party groups of MPs concerned with pensions, at which Lord Turner answered some searching questions, so some of what is here may be less delicately worded than the Turner report itself.

The first two OPA principles were concerned with the value of the State Pension:

The first tier pension provided by the state should take people out of poverty without the need for means-tested top ups.

The Turner proposals provide for this, in an evolutionary way, over decades.  They point out that means testing will probably never go away, but can be greatly reduced from the prevalence (some 80% of pensioner households) that would arise if present plans were continued.

Increases to state pensions should be linked to earnings rather than prices.

This is part of the Turner proposals.

The next four OPA design principles were concerned with how better state provision would be paid for:

Current spending on the Second State Pension should be redirected to other pension benefits.

The Turner proposal keeps the second state pension (S2P) - that is the bit that is not paid at the same way to all pensioners, but is related to your earnings.  However, the proposal is to steadily reduce the earnings-related role that it plays, until it comes to be a flat rate increase that everybody gets to the Basic State Pension.

Tax relief on pension contributions should be limited to the basic rate.

The Report acknowledges that much pensions contribution tax relief goes to those who least need it, with more than half going to the 12% who are the 40% tax payers.  The report argues against simply limiting everyone's relief to the basic rate for various reasons.  At the All-Party meeting, Lord Turner emphasised that it would be easy to escape the effect of such a change - there would be a further move to salary sacrifice approaches, with the employee contribution replaced by a reduction in salary.

The Inland Revenue already places a limit on the amount of tax-advantaged saving-for-a-pension that an individual can have and the Report suggests this is the most effective method of directing the tax relief.

Reduced ageism in the workplace, allowing actual retirement ages to rise.

The Report offers a carrot and a stick, aiming to overcome the tendency of employers to regard younger workers as more profitable.  The stick would remove the employer power to drop people from a pension scheme on the basis of age.  (So that IBM's Normal Retirement Age of 63 would become a thing of the past).

The carrot would be reduced National Insurance Contributions from the employer for the older employees.

It is worth noting that the Inland Revenue have already removed the barrier that once prevented you receiving a pension from the company while still working part-time for the company.

Actual retirement ages are not the same thing at the State Retirement Age, which is the age at which government decides state pensions should be delivered.  The Report recommends that the SRA becomes an instrument for controlling costs, increasing to reduce the rising cost of pensions to the public purse.  This would mean that people could reliably predict the value of the state pension they would get, but would not know the age at which they would get it until about 15 years before they received it.

The expectations in the Report are that the number of years of receipt of the state pension will increase even if that pension starts later, because of lives being longer than now.

Compulsion is necessary to raise the contribution levels of defined contribution schemes.

This principle of the OPA's was based on the assumption that any compulsion would be applied via existing pension schemes.  The Turner Report proposes a new savings vehicle, run on a national basis to reduce the cost of administering it.  The National Pensions Saving Scheme (NPSS) is not strictly compulsory but two features ensure there will be a high take-up.  There is auto-enrollment; positive action by the employee is needed to avoid joining the scheme.  There is an employer contribution.  It is expected that the employer contribution will not be a straight addition to employer costs because the employer will compensate by reducing salaries.  Faced with a choice of joining or not joining, an employee will have diminished salary prospects either way.  That makes it almost inevitable that joining, and hence getting the employer contribution, is financially sensible.

The actual numbers are 3% of salary from the company, 5% from the employee, although the tax relief on the latter allows it to be presented as 4% from the employee and 1% from the government.  Questioned on the adequacy of the total 8%, Lord Turner noted that higher numbers would increase the incentive for the company to discourage participation.  (In his words, the employer might say "Stay out of the scheme and I will put another 150 quid in your Xmas bonus")

Note that that the employer does not need to make the NPSS available if it already has pensions schemes which are at least as good.  (So IBM UK would not have to get involved with NPSS)

The final three principles are ones that the member associations of the  OPA have a particular interest in because of their interfaces with companies and trusts.  The Turner report is disappointingly, but not unexpectedly, short on discussion of these.  (Trustees get few mentions, the regulators are only mentioned in the context "Analysts, policymakers, and regulators need to work together on the development of administrative systems for the proposed NPSS".  The Ombudsman is not mentioned at all.)  It may be that these matters fell outside the terms of reference for the Report, or it may be that the committee did not see a strong connection between people's willingness to save and their confidence in the mechanisms designed to protect the savings from maladministration.

There should be greater protection for defined benefit occupational scheme members, against untrustworthy providers.

The OPA wants a mechanism whereby points of law that effect numerous scheme members can be pursued in the High Court.  In the current arrangements, this is too costly for a member to consider.  The OPA wants a considerable strengthening of the Ombudsman's Office expertise and capability.

The operation of trust boards should be improved.

OPA is concerned that regulations allow trustees to decide that the mandatory Member Nominated Trustees should be the Financial Director of the company and some of his staff.  OPA would like to prohibit past or present employees of the company being the chairman of trust boards.

 Actuarial valuations should be more transparent and less open to manipulation.

OPA notes that an alert membership is the best safeguard a scheme can have, the more so if they are well informed.

Contributed by Brian Marks in his role as chairman of the OPA.