Newsletter No 48
Dec 7, 2011
This newsletter is regrettably negative - much of it is about what has not been done.
The hearing of the main IBM High Court case has been delayed until February 2013. That will make it seven years since employees were forced to a major decision about C-Plan membership, for which some feel they were given false information, and four years since the announcement that earning C-Plan pension was to be abolished.
The "main High Court case" referred to above is what the Trustee refers to as the "Bad Faith" case. Since this Newsletter was first released it has been announced that the rectification claim, a different case, will be heard in 2012. (We think this is the meaning of the announcement. It is somewhat unclear because the Trustee refers to the "C-Plan" case, when both cases involve the C-Plan.) The distinction between the cases was covered in Newsletter 45.
We have not heard a date for any of the tribunal cases. The John Perry case has been delayed into 2012.
It is a matter of opinion how far this represents "Justice delayed is justice denied". There is little doubt that delay is in IBM's interest. Time allows adrenaline and outrage to subside, and favours focus on technicalities rather than on what behaviour is acceptable. Meanwhile the de facto pension scheme is what IBM wanted and the cost cutting has reached the IBM accounts in time to embellish the position as Sam Palmisano reaches the end of his term. For the Trustee, a longer time means a greater turnover of trustees, weakening their individual responsibility for the damage done to people's lives. Further time solidifying the scheme as IBM wants it will constrain what the trustee might be asked to do by the eventual judge, in correcting the 2009 decisions. Further time means further work for lawyers. The disadvantages of delay fall almost entirely on the scheme members.
The suggested reason for delay is slowness in disclosure of information by IBM. However, the High Court judges who have been managing the preparation of the case have powers to order disclosures, and IBM could be punished for willfully frustrating disclosure, so the pace is not entirely for IBM to decide. Questions can be raised about the level of commitment in pursuing the case. In particular, would the Trustee claim of "neutrality" be better described as passivity, or even as endorsement of IBM's arrangements? (In 2006 the employees were told that the deal they were being offered met the Trustee's "long term stability and funding objectives". Does anybody believe the 2009 happenings to be compatible with that?)
When there are rioters with placards we expect the police to quell the rioters, irrespective of any sympathy the police may have with the messages on the placards. It is their job. When a company behaves badly in dealings with its pension scheme we might expect the Trustee to act positively on behalf of the members, irrespective of any sympathy with the profit motive of the company. Our Trustee had an opportunity to take a position on the Company's behaviour. They might have taken the position that the behaviour was incompatible with previous agreements and they would seek an injunction if IBM tried to impose it without a Court decision. (The Trustee did say it would not agree to Deed changes until a Court had reached an opinion but it did not stick to that). Instead we find the Trustee washing its hands of responsibility for protecting the members, and preferring distant after-the-fact possible remedies. (The equivalent of the police deciding not to act because they could not be certain how the Courts would eventually deal with alleged rioters!)
For those who take a lofty view of these affairs, the key question is whether society has adequate checks to curb the activities of bad corporations. A highly distinguished group of experts has recently studied this, in the area of tax avoidance. The report has a good exposition of the difficulties in judging a corporation's behaviour - where is the boundary between "egregious, or very aggressive, tax avoidance schemes" and "the large centre ground of responsible tax planning"? The report has perspective on how those who pay for technical advice influence that advice: "It put tax professionals, whether advisers or company tax managers, in the invidious position of having to decide whether they should try to reduce the tax bill by using such [abusive] schemes, given that on the present law the schemes would almost certainly produce that result, even though they personally regarded the schemes with distaste. The obvious dilemma lies in the fact that their competitors might set aside such scruples and gain a commercial advantage by recommending or adopting the scheme". The conclusion of the report was that a profound change in the tax law was needed, "a general anti-abuse rule". There are parallels in curbing corporate bad behaviour towards pension scheme members. Currently the control is through Trust Law. Trust Law was developed over centuries when the interests of the benefactor and the beneficiary were aligned - the laird wanted to provide for his faithful retainer, or the parent for an under-age child, etc. There are good grounds for saying that Trust Law cannot reasonably be stretched to cover pension dealings, where the corporation and scheme member interests are opposed - the corporation views the scheme member as a cost; there is no benefactor.
One can elaborate how the symptoms of faulty law are paralleled across tax evasion, professional advice, unfulfilled pension deals and stealth redundancy. (Our Trust's expenditure on "Legal and other professional fees" has risen steeply - £150K in 1990, £1600K in 2010. ). But those parallels are academic - the realpolitik is that the Treasury sees tax law changes as good. So we will see that change, but not even a study of the pension law position.
How IBM UK sees the merits of delays can be judged by their approach to internal complaints - the forum mentions one lasting 13 months.
MED ELECTIONS
There will be MED elections in 2012. Involvement as voter or candidate in these elections has always been more symbolic than effective - an expression of desire to be influential on behalf of scheme members rather than an expectation of influence. It is impossible to assess MEDs individually or collectively on their records since they are directors of IBM UK Pensions Trust Ltd and the directors as a board influence secrecy. However, outcomes are not secret. Since the last election we have seen the Trustee refuse a request for talks from the Pension Consultation Committee (PCC), when both PCC and trustees were considering the surprise 2009 IBM proposals. It is hard to see how any MED could have considered that to be in the members' interests. The Trustee has been willing to acknowledge the "bad faith" claims against IBM but unwilling to use the power to prevent deeds changes prior to Court consideration. The Trustee adopted a "Statement of Funding Principles" that called for an actuarial valuation when "there is a significant fall in the value of the assets, or other change in market conditions which could have a significant adverse impact upon the financial position of the Plan", and then decided that the credit crisis of 2007-2008 was not significant enough to justify a December 2008 valuation. The outcome was a year's delay before there was any regulatory pressure on IBM to do anything about a fund deficit which ballooned to the £1B area. It is hard to see how any MED could have voted for that.
The trend away from final salary schemes towards money purchase schemes reduces the importance of all trustees, including MEDs, because money purchase involves fewer decisions. (Oversimplifying a bit, the trustees just have to ensure that money is collected according to the payroll and forwarded in bulk to the insurance companies that the members have chosen.)
Although you may feel MED elections have proved to be an irrelevance, it is worth repeating a couple of points AMIPP has made before. The inferior status given to deferred members, who can neither stand nor vote, is at odds with the long term interest in the scheme that deferreds have. Retired MEDs are intrinsically better placed than employee MEDs, not because of their personal qualities but because they have more time to devote and do not have to balance what they do as MEDs with concern about how IBM's assessment of them could affect their careers.
NATIONAL ASPECTS, RPI/CPI
In Newsletter 47 we told you about the High Court challenge to CPI use and said "It will be a surprise if that succeeds - the unions are unlikely to find the judge taking the politically sensitive position that a minister made an unreasonable choice, however unreasonable the choice is shown to be by analysis". There was no surprise - the judgement shows only one of the three judges thought the Minister had done anything illegal. However, all the judges were clear that Steve Webb's decision was motivated by cost cutting. This contradicts what he said in discussions and to Parliament - that the motivation was the superiority of CPI as a measurement. (For us it adds to the frustration that he would not engage on the question of how a gift of £175M from IBM UK scheme members to IBM Corporation shareholders could be regarded as a UK economic gain. The £175M figure is from our fund's valuation.)
Since the last newsletter the government has improved on its proposals for public sector pensions. It has also extended the depressing of public sector salaries, thus reducing pensions. This illustrates the difficulty of dealing with an employer when there is no alternative employer.
The date for the introduction of an increased age for receiving a state pension has been made nearer, to be age 67 by 2026. How much this will save the Treasury depends on what the cost will be in supporting those too young for a state pension and too old to hold a job.
The schedule for the mandatory participation of more employers in the NEST scheme has been slowed. NEST has already been criticised as having contributions that are too low for an adequate pension. The new schedule risks adding "too late" to "too little". There is a cycle here that is moving in the wrong direction. Employees will opt-out of NEST if they regard the management costs on their savings as excessive. The postulated low management cost for NEST depends on economies of scale. Large aggregate savings in NEST depend on mandatory employer participation plus limited employee opt-out.
For its economic predictions, the Office for Budget Responsibility will be assuming that CPI will be 1.4% p.a. less than RPI inflation. AMIPP used a 0.5% gap in its Newsletter 46 assessments. Our Trust's actuarial valuation uses 0.75%. (The latter two roughly correspond with the history of the gap.) At first sight one might say that the predictions do not matter, what matters is what actually happens to CPI. However, there are risks for scheme members in the government prediction:
(a) The government has found that it can manipulate increases, even for private sector pensions earned years ago. It may have acquired a taste for this, and use divergence from its own predictions as a cause for again adjusting the measurement methods.
(b) Trustees may be tempted to follow the government lead in this creative bookkeeping. Adjusting assumptions about RPI and CPI is a fruitful way for them to obscure the real deficits in their schemes.
Your National Insurance Contributions are/were intended in part to pay state pensions. This principle is not lost in the plans for more integration of NIC and income tax.
INTERNATIONAL
Here is a quote from a US website:
Throughout the IBM Pension heist, Ellen E. Schultz, a Pulitzer Prize winning investigative reporter with the Wall Street Journal, exposed IBM's and other companies shenanigans that have cost retirees millions and millions of dollars, while enriching corporate executives.
Ms. Schultz has just published a book that every IBMer should read: Retirement Heist: How Companies Plunder and Profit From the Nest Eggs of American Workers.
Amazon has it. The book is about US mechanisms but the same corporate callousness applies to IBM's UK schemes. There is more about the book on the US website.
Here is some context on global pension deficits.
Sam Palmisano, who'll be out as CEO Jan. 1, has a payout valued at over $170 million: $76 million in deferred or accrued pay, $65.7 million in stock and a $29.7 million pension.
FROM THE HOME PAGE
The remainder of the material in this newsletter first appeared on the AMIPP home page, in the period since the last newsletter, so you may have already read it.
There is a seven minute streaming video that presents the latest results from the Office of National Statistics annual survey of occupational pensions. It is not intended to offer solutions, it is just an undecorated account of how this part of the pension provision industry has failed. 29 Oct 2011
RPI/CPI update 4 Oct 2011
There are no reasons to be optimistic about efforts to prevent changes that use CPI but some of the twists in the sparring are worth noting. You have probably noticed that when your County Council or some other authority writes to you about something you won't welcome, they use a formula like "After legal advice..." or "After consulting the Actuary...". Such statements are meant to give the impression that there are good reasons behind the unwelcome decision, and that even though the authority had the ultimate decision they don't want to carry all the responsibility. The change to CPI increases on already-earned pension is different. The Minister introduced the change without consulting statistics professionals and without consulting the pensions industry. (The belated consultation was about how the change was to be introduced, not whether it should be.) We now know that statisticians would have advised against CPI as a measure of pensioner inflation. This has led the authorities to take an unusual posture - saying that taking inputs was not relevant because the ultimate decision was the Minister's. ("Section 150 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 states that decisions on how inflation indices are used in the determination of rates of benefits and pension payments are matters for ministers and Parliament"). It remains to be seen how this line will play before a judge.
Our Trustee's approach to softening its responsibility was an incorrect statement in the Members' Report: "In those cases where RPI is not specified as the measure of inflation for increases in the Trust Deed and Rules, the Trustee must award increases in line with annual statutory orders issued by the Government". This is incorrect because the statutory orders for private sector schemes are about minimum values for increases and not about imposing maximum values, in the same way that Minimum Wage regulation sets a floor on wages but says nothing about a ceiling. The government favoured CPI and pointed out that if the deeds could be interpreted as uncertain that was a "potential opportunity" for trustees to decide on CPI. An "opportunity" is not a "must". Because our Trustee had allowed the deeds to become out-dated, referring to a source of statistics that did not exist, there was an opportunity in our case.
In the British Airways scheme the deeds did not specify RPI. The trustees had the power to decide on RPI but decided on CPI instead. The scheme members have reacted strongly. Three Member Nominated Trustees have resigned. (Two of them have since stood for re-election and won on a pro-RPI platform). In a poll of members, 11,362 people, 94% of those who voted, said it was in the best interests of members that the trustees should hard-wire RPI increases into Airways Pension Scheme rules. The argument in favour of CPI for the British Airways scheme is that saving the shareholders' money might be necessary to save jobs in the long run. How far should trustees take that argument? Not many people would regard Arthur Scargill as a template for reasonableness, but he did produce a reasoned argument that the Coal Board trustees should not be investing in nuclear power companies because that was acting against the interests of miners retaining their jobs. At the time Scargill was hated by the authorities and the Courts dutifully decided that the "interests of the members" meant primarily the financial interests of the members, and the trustees were bound to act entirely on expected returns when investing. However, in today's climate there is no certainty that a Court would decide prospective BA job losses were "speculative and remote".
Deficits 28 Sept 2011
There is a Regulator decision that helps
to put IBM UK's pension fund recovery plan into context. The best reassurance
that a scheme will continue to pay pensions is the future viability of the
sponsor. UK regulations ensure that if the sponsor stays solvent, the pensions
will be paid. Normally the interests of the company and scheme members in
avoiding insolvency will be aligned. However, if the funding deficit is large
there are two circumstances where the interests can become opposed. The company
may arrange a "pre-packaged" insolvency, where the company is declared insolvent
but the productive capability of the company is immediately acquired by a new
company which is free of the pension liabilities. Another scenario is where a
foreign owner puts its UK company into insolvency and refuses to abide by the UK
regulations which oblige the owner to support the pensions.
Neither of these scenarios seems likely for IBM since the damage to the IBM
brand would be immense. Nevertheless our trustees must have thought non-support
by IBM Corporation was a practical possibility, since they made concessions to
obtain a written "Guarantee" of the support (for a few years).
Hence, despite the very good long term prospects for IBM Corp, the size of our
funding deficit is cause for scheme member concern.
The latest valuation, for December 2009, puts the C-Plan deficit at £677 million
after accounting for the RPI to CPI degrading of pensions that occurred since
then and prejudging that IBM would win the Court cases. There are no plans for
another valuation until December 2012 is reported on in 2014, although there may
be reviews (which are not bound by regulation to a recovery plan). However,
rough estimates are not difficult. Indices like the FTSE 100 and Dow Jones are
within a few percent of their December 2009 values. (There is a natural tendency
for categories of investments to move together in their returns because if one
category of investment was much superior then investors would pile into it and
hence alter the price, making it less attractive.)
The benefits paid out each year (£300+M) exceed the investment income (around
£100M) so without asset growth or adequate fund contributions the deficit
increases.
An updated valuation could be expected to be realistic about future returns and
about longevity. When considering whether to have a valuation for 2008, the
Trustee had a Statement of Funding Principles suggesting interim valuations if
"there is a significant fall in the value of the assets, or other change in
market conditions which could have a significant adverse impact upon the
financial position of the Plan". (See
Newsletter 43) Clearly, the Trustee did not then regard the 2007-2008
financial crisis as significantly adverse for the plan, but it would be
unreasonable to continue with that view in the light of the years since. The
Actuarial Profession has released
further mortality tables . These differ so slightly from the previous tables
that they can be regarded as confirmation of the previous tables. AMIPP
previously discussed how the Trustee used death rate assumptions for the
valuation that were 15% higher than those in the relevant table.
The 2009 valuation describes quantitatively how the deficit is greatly increased
by small changes in assumptions. It is not hard to see that a realistic
valuation now would put the deficit over the £1 billion mark. The last time the
deficit reached that sort of level the Company response was a one-off payment of
some £0.6 billion into the fund. (There are those who feel the Trustee conceded
too much independence to get that payment, but that is another story).
This time the current plan is for IBM to pay £63 million annually into the fund.
This stems from the trustee/company/actuary agreement to disagree - using one
figure for the expected return on investment when calculating the deficit and a
more optimistic figure when deciding the recovery plan. The trustees had an
alternative - they could have asked the Regulator to intervene.
In the case of EMI Group, the Regulator was asked to intervene and a plan to
eliminate the deficit in five years was agreed. The Regulator would be quick to
say that every case is different but nevertheless this gives an indication of
what is considered reasonable. It seems unlikely that the Regulator would agree
to a 15 year period of deficit removal for IBM. (Particularly with IBM Corp
spending many billions each year buying up its own shares).
On DC:
It is questionable how far those with a DC element to their prospective pension
are "as aware of the value of their DC pension savings as homeowners are of
the value of their property". The
calculations nationally make depressing reading.
CONTACTS
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DISCLAIMER
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AMIPP, the Association of Members of IBM UK Pension Plans
www.amipp.org.uk