Everybody is entitled to their special interests, however strange,
and I have recently taken an interest in the regulations about
occupational pensions, and their application.
This led me to being present at an oral hearing conducted by OPRA,
the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority. Some of you may be
interested in this account. Bits that might
be relevant to IBM are in this colour.
The Background
The Thorn pensions fund had a statutory surplus calculated at more than
105%. The statutory surplus is not what is usually referred to as
"surplus". Usually "surplus" means the result of a calculation
agreed by the actuary and the trustees. The calculation for the
statutory surplus is laid down in the regulations, and always gives a
much lower figure for the surplus. IBM
complainants think their statutory surplus was wrongly calculated
because the phrase "from time to time" in the deeds was taken as meaning
the same as "regular" in the regulations (about when potential
increases should be reviewed).
The regulations require that when there is such a statutory surplus,
the trustees have to do something about it. One of the things they
wanted to do was to pay £50M of it to the company. The regulations
allow for that, provided the retirees were already being provided with
some protection, called Limited Price Indexation, against the erosion of
their income by inflation. That LPI, on pension derived from all
service, was being provided. IBM doesn't
provide it and could not be paid in corresponding circumstances.
The snag to paying the company was that the deeds prohibited the
trust funds being used in that way, and prevented the trustees amending
the deeds to allow it. The trustees
applied to OPRA, which had a power to allow them to amend their deeds to
allow the payment. This is known as a modification order.
The Ombudsman does not have this power, which is a reason why this was
an OPRA matter rather than an Ombudsman matter.
Any granting of this modification order application is being
contested by some Thorn retirees. The hearing that I went to was
not to do with the modification
order itself, but about the process in applying for it.
The regulations require that when the trustees try to go down this
route they keep the members informed so that they can comment/protest to
the trust and to OPRA. The hearing I went to was about whether that was
done properly, and the ramifications if it was not.
The Location
The hearing was held at "The Duke of York's Headquarters", near
Sloane Square in London. This is an old barracks now given over
largely to being the headquarters for various government institutions.
Quiet, spacious, big rooms with high ceilings - a good atmosphere for a
serious meeting. The hearing was legal in approach but there were
few formalities - no wigs, although we were required to stand when the
decision makers came in to the room. Attendance was by invitation;
I got in through my COPAS associations with the Thorn pensioners.
The Parties
OPRA splits itself into a judicial part, that can actually make
modification orders and the like, and a regulatory part. The
regulator is there to make sure that the proper process and regulations
are followed. The Ombudsman's Office splits
internally into administration, which is before an investigation
actually happens, and investigation. Neither activity has an
accountable
organisation monitoring how they do their thing.
The trust was represented because they were being accused of a shoddy
job. The company was represented because they wanted to avoid
delay and risk in getting the money. The retirees were represented
via the Thorn and EMI Pensioners Association (TEPA). TEPA wanted the
modification order review set back to stage zero on the grounds that
necessary notifications to members had not been made.
So five parties with OPRA-Regulatory (which raised the concern about
notification) and TEPA somewhat aligned on the one hand, the trust and
the company aligned on the other, and OPRA-Judicial to decide the
outcome.
What Happened
There was a raised dais at the front for the three from OPRA-Judicial.
(Two male, one female. Basically they listened, with very few
questions, and their leader decided when the breaks should be.)
Facing that a long bench with the other parties. It looked like
the QC's for company and trust had two assistants each, as did the
regulator, but the QC for TEPA was unassisted. (The TEPA QC was
not being paid. I presume he was willing to work on the basis that
if the bigger issue of the £50M ever came to court, he would get that
well-paid job.) Anyway, only the
QCs and Regulator spoke. Three female at that bench. Behind
that about 60 in the audience, almost all elderly men.
First to speak was the regulator, who first went through the
relevant regulations, crucially section 69(3)(a) which
requires the trustees to take "all reasonable steps to ensure" that the
members got timely notification. He explained what powers
the judicial trio had, and went through the common ground (which
included the fact that not all members would have received the notice in
time). Obviously, most of this wasn't new to the primary
participants but the regulator was good about saying things, and reading
from textbooks, for the benefit of the "people behind", i.e. the
audience. (later the TEPA QC was also good in this respect.)
Next up was the Pensions Manager. The trustees had told him to
send out the notices but without specific instructions or reporting back
to ensure the dates were met. The Pensions Manager had used an
outside firm to do the actual envelope stuffing and mailing, again
without as much monitoring and urgency as there could have been.
One thing new to me was how Thorn communicated with its deferred
members. They had lost track of many of these but they still had
their National Insurance numbers. It turns out the Department of
Work and Pensions will contract to send out mail on that basis, since
they can relate NI numbers to mailing addresses. (Although the
regulations didn't require the trustees to arrange notification of
members they didn't have addresses for.)
After that came the TEPA QC and the others. Since I was only
there the one day, I don't know all that was said but the themes were
straightforward - one side stressing the strength of what the
regulations said the trustees must do, and the other side saying that
they only missed by a bit and pragmatically it made no difference.
There were some complications in the usual lawyerish multi-level
arguments, analogous to "You didn't lend me your vase; if you lent it to
me I didn't break it; if I broke it, it wasn't worth anything; if it was
worth anything the court has no power to order compensation etc".
These complications were well explained.
If you had been judging, what would you have decided? Was
it vital to uphold the letter of the law, avoiding the slippery slope of
allowing trustees to say that they nearly met the requirements and that
their reckless driving caused no accident? Or should the pragmatic view be taken that if the purpose of the regulations was not
seriously thwarted there was no point in restarting the notification
process?
OPRA decided on the latter view. It is worth noting that
even if the retirees had won, that would only have forced a
re-notification to all the retirees of the proposal for the modification
order. It would not, by itself, have stopped the order.
Whoever won this particular day, the more important issue of whether the
modification order (needed for the company to get the £50M) should be
allowed would still have to be considered.
My impressions of the day:
It was all very civilised and thoughtful, enough to make me feel good
about living in the UK. It must have been expensive, the
issue wasn't that vital, but everybody was keen to do the right thing in
a visible way.
This was a case where the provider was asking for purpose and
pragmatism to be taken into account, and the consumer was stressing the
words of the documents. It is usually the other way round, e.g. in
the Equitable case where nothing in the documents prevented the
Equitable board from shafting the Guaranteed Annuity Rate consumers but
even so the board's exercise of discretion was not allowed.
Another example from IBM: the retirees want
to stress that the originators of the trust arrangements, in 1957, could
not conceivably have intended something as fundamentally different as a
money-purchase plan to be grafted on without that money-purchase plan
having its own funding. The providers will want to stress that no
words, in the documents that have been found, expressly constrain using
the final salary funds for such a grafting.
The number of people complaining may be factor in decisions.
The QC for the Thorn company made a point of contrasting the number
of retirees that complained with the much larger number that did not.
We can't know if this observation influenced OPRA's decision but clearly
the QC thought it might. In the IBM case
many retirees agreed to withhold their complaints from the Ombudsman's
Office because the complaints that did go forward were adequate.
We have to hope that if ever IBM tries to belittle the number of
objections then the Ombudsman's Office won't be impressed.
Based on just this day with OPRA and on experience with the
Ombudsman's Office, they are very different in approach.
OPRA is what one would like the Ombudsman's Office to be, in visibly
taking all the necessary steps. (Whether you like the outcome is another
matter). (The IBM complainants' concerns
about lack of comprehensive investigation and accountability in the
Ombudsman's Office are discussed elsewhere.)
Some groups have suggested to the Pickering Review that the
Ombudsman's Office lacks resources. The total levy to run
OPRA, OPAS, and the Ombudsman's Office seems to be less than £15M, see
www.dwp.gov.uk/consultations/consult/2002/opra/opra.pdfThis
seems a very small amount when the funds being protected run to £800
billion. (The IBM Trust said it was a
waste of time and money to explain a £31M "miscellaneous" cost to
members because it was so small.) The levy is collected by OPRA
but presumably the amount is decided by the Department of Work and
Pensions.
I expect this website will pick up the Thorn story again when it
comes to the main event - whether to allow a modification order.
The central issue then is likely to be the statutory surplus
calculation. The intention of the regulations is to specify how
this calculation should be done, and to leave little to the choices of
the trustees and the actuary, so that the result is a reflection of
actual assets and liabilities rather than of choices made.
However, this is not watertight. The TEPA members will argue
that the company set out to over-estimate the strength of the fund so it
would appear that the company could take the £50M without unduly harming
the members. This is the opposite of one
claim by the IBM retirees. They think IBM wrongly under-calculated
the surplus to avoid bringing into play regulations that require
consideration of possible extra benefits to members. Although in
the opposite direction, this is like the TEPA consideration insofar as
it concerns the question of the latitude that the institutions have to
manipulate the statutory surplus result.
This report by Brian Marks, May 2002